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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the effects of audit rates and certain other factors on federal income tax 
filings and collections. Using data drawn primarily from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue for the years 1977- 1986, we investigate the overall performance of the federal
revenue collection process and estimate that total IRS collections in 1986 would have risen by
approximately forty billion dollars had the federal audit rate remained constant at its 1977 level
during the intervening period. 
THE EFFECT OF AUDIT RATES ON 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX FILINGS AND COLLECTIONS, 1977-1986 
Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. Graetz, and Louis L. Wilde* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The decade 1977- 1986 witnessed a dramatic decrease in the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") 
audit rate. The audit rate for individuals declined from about 2 1/2 percent to just over one percent 
during this period. Audit rates of corporations declined even more precipitously, from about 9 1/2 
percent to around 3 percent. Although exact comparisons are not possible due to changes in IRS 
classifications of taxpayers, audit rates of higher income individuals declined substantially. With the 
exception of a burst in activity for tax shelter partnerships in the early 1980s, partnership and small 
business corporation audit rates reflect a similar downward trend. The declines in audits seem 
principally due to two factors: first, they were a natural consequence of the budget policies of the 
period and second, the IRS seemed to adopt a policy of substituting t.':!ird-party information 
reporting coupled with IRS document matching and increased taxpayer and tax preparer penalties for 
an audit-dependent enforcement policy.1
A consensus seems to have emerged that relatively little additional revenue would be produced 
from increased tax enforcement, although President Bush's budget for fiscal years 1991- 1995 
includes $5.6 billion of additional revenues increased IRS enforcement funding and improved IRS 
management. The strengthening in the 1980s of third-party infonnation reporting of tax-related 
transactions to the IRS and IRS matching of such reports to tax returns means that few effective 
opportunities for effective third party reporting remain. 2 
Penalties for underreporting tax liabilities also underwent drastic revisions during the past 
decade and the 1989 penalty revision legislation suggests that further penalty increases are not 
feasible. The 1989 restructuring of taxpayer penalties seems to reflect agreement that the severity of 
the penalty structure of the 1980s, in combination with a historically low audit rate, created 
* California Institute ofTeclmology, Yale Law School, and California Institute of Technology, respectively. This paper is 
a substantially revised version of Dubin. Graetz and Wilde (1987). Professor Graetz thanks the National Science 
Foundation for research support (grant no. SES-870443) as do Professors Dubin and Wilde (grant no. SES-8701027). All 
authors thank Michael Udell for research assistance. 
I. For further development of tltis point see Dubin. Graetz, and Wilde (1989). 
2. Indeed, ignoring W-2 forms, the number of infonnation reports per return filed for individuals rose from around 3.5 in 
1977 to just over 6 in 1985. 
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unfairness in the tax compliance process.3 
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the overall role of audits in the 
federal revenue collection process. Surprisingly, this has never been done. Although the general 
deterrence effects of audits have been widely acknowledged, the IRS never has put forth any 
estimates of the "spillover" benefits of audits (the increase in collections from taxpayers, whether or 
not they are audited, who report more taxes due in response to an increase in the likelihood of an 
audit). To date, only the the direct revenues obtained from audits (additional taxes and penalties) 
have been estimated. 
The principal innovation in our empirical work is directly to estimate collections rather than 
first attempting to construct a measure of noncompliance, and then extrapolating from 
noncompliance to revenue. This is consonant with the theoretical literature, in which taxpayers 
typically decide on an optimal level of reported income as opposed to an optimal level of 
noncompliance (although the difference is largely semantical). 
In particular, our empirical analysis is based on two models, both of which are estimated using 
a state-level, time series cross-section data set for the years 1977-86. One model specifies IRS 
collections per return filed as a function of audit rates, rates of issuance of CP2000s (computer 
generated IRS notices informing taxpayers that additional taxes are due, principally as a result either 
ofIRS matching of third party information reports with tax returns or of return consistency checks, 
such as those for mathematical accuracy), and a variety of socio-economic factors. The other model 
specifies returns filed per capita as a function of the same variables. TI>is decomposition of total 
collections into collections per return filed and returns filed pet capita all6Ws usfo separate the 
effects of underlying explanatory variables on total collections into a "collections effect" and a 
"filings effect." 
In addition, the time-series nature of our data allows us to investigate the overall performance 
of the federal revenue collection process during the decade 1977-86. We explore the relationship 
between audit rates and tax collections by asking what would have happened to total IRS collections 
from individuals had the audit rate remained constant at its 1977 level over the period 1977-86. We 
estimate that total IRS collections would have been greater by 4 1.4 billion dollars in 1986, or about 7 
percent of total individual collections, had the audit rate remained constant at its 1977 level. 
Although changes in collections during the last decade necessarily reflect a variety of other tax 
compliance factors-most notably the dramatic increases in third-party information reporting and 
the IRS' s ability to match such information to tax return submissions, as well as the substantial new 
3. See§§ 7711-7743 of P. L. 101-239 ('The Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act of 1989"). See 
also, e.g., Testimony of Michael J. Saltzman, Charles J. Muller and James E. Merrett on behalf of the Penalties Task Force 
of the section of Taxation of the American Bar Association, before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee of Ways and 
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, July 28, 1988. 
4. In estimating additional collections, we are to some extent treating additional taxes and penalties recommended by the 
IRS on audit as fully collectible. To the extent that these amounts are reduced by subsequent settlement negotiations or an 
inability of the IRS to collect taxes due actual collections would be lowered. 
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and increased penalties enacted by congress in 1981 and 1982-our results confirm the prominence 
of audit rates in the revenue collection process. These findings have important policy implications 
for tax administration, and generally confirm an economic approach to tax noncompliance: 
taxpayers do seem to respond rationally, even predictably, to the nature of the tax lottery confronting 
them. 
We not only estimate the total decrease in IRS collections from individuals due to the fall in 
audit rates over the period 1977-1986, but we are also able to separate that estimate into an amount
attributable to the lost additional tax and penalties that would have been collected directly from 
audits and an amount attributable to spillover effects. In particular, spillover effects constitute 34.4 
billion dollars out of the total 41.4 billion dollars. The spillover effects of increases in audit rates 
therefore produce roughly five out of every six dollars of additional revenues. 
Finally, we have a number of results regarding taxpayer filing behavior. Most significantly, we 
find that increases in the audit rate decrease returns filed per capita and increases in the percent of the 
adult population with at least a high school education increase significantly the number of returns 
filed per capita. These findings shed new light on compliance factors related to nonfilers, a 
significant tax compliance category that heretofore has been largely unexplored. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and 
estimation procedures. Section 3 presents our results on the effect of audit rates on individual tax 
collections for the years 1977-1986 and summarizes other empirical results of general interest. 
Section 4 concludes with some brief comments on the policy implications of our results. 
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis generates estimates of the effects of federal audit rates on collections 
per return and on returns filed per capita. We also estimate the relationship between state tax rates 
and various socio-economic factors and total federal income tax collections. We specify a model in 
which collections per return depends on the state tax rate, the audit rate, the rate of issuance of 
CP2000s, per capita income, and various other socio-economic variables. We also specify a second 
model which relates federal returns filed per capita to the same variables. 
2.1 Data 
Our data is drawn from a variety of sources, but the core of our analysis is based upon on data 
reported in the Annual Repons of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the years 1977-1986, 
which covers the government fiscal years, running from October 1 to September 30, 1977-86.5
These reports include district level data on Internal Revenue Service collections, number of returns 
5. We have attempted to extend our analysis to 1977-88, as data from the AMual Reports of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue for the years 1987 and 1988 has become available. However, several anomalies in the collections data have 
frustrated this effort. For example, between 1986 and 1987, total individual collections as reported by the IRS rose from 
$2.69 billion to $3.86 billion in Arkansas and from $4.41 billion to $6.24 billion in Kentucky, while independent Bureau of 
Ec-0nomic £.c\.r1alysis cstiauates of pet capita income only rose from $11,136 to $12.705 in Arkansas and from $17,741 to
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filed, amount and number of refunds, number of examinations, total additional tax and penalties 
recommended after examination, and budgets. The data is further broken down by "class of tax"­
individual, corporate, estate, gift, etc. For most states, the whole state is one IRS district. Until 1984 
California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas each had two districts and New York had four. In 
1984 another district was added to Texas and three were added to California. In all cases of multiple 
districts within a state, we aggregate district level data from the annual reports to the state level. 
Our present analysis focuses on the federal individual income tax. In the annual reports, 
individual taxes include returns with Schedule C or F present (nonfarm business or farm) but vary 
over the years as to whether partnership returns are included. Given the importance of tax shelter 
investments for tax compliance in the years investigated here, and the reporting of tax shelter losses 
on partnership returns as well as on Schedules C and E of individual returns, we aggregate 
partnership with individual returns whenever the annual reports do not do so. 
While, in theory, other data might bener facilitate the analysis we have undertaken here, a 
variety of limitations restrict our ability to use less aggregate data sources. Probably the best data 
base would consist of a sample of individual tax returns over this time period, but section 6103 of 
the Internal Revenue Code limits the IRS ability to releasing such individual level data and section 
7216 of the Code similarly prohibits the use of such individual level data collected by tax return 
preparers. The IRS, from time to time, has made Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
("TCMP") data-data that involves a stratified sample of intensive IRS audits-available to 
researchers, but such data is typically aggregated in some fashion.6 While we ourselves have used 
such data in other inquiries,7 the data used here-from the Commissioner's annual reports merged
with state level data from other sources-permit us to explore a wide variety of questions. In 
particular, we not only derive estimates of the effect of audits on revenues, but also disaggregate 
such estimates into the direct and indirect (or spillover) components. 
We use the following seven primary variables from the annual reports: (1) total collections 
from individual income and employment taxes;8 (2) total refunds to individuals; (3) total tax returns 
filed;9 (4) number of individual income tax returns filed; (5) number of individual income tax returns 
$18,401 in Kentucky. Such dramatic increases in collections cannot be explained by increases in tax rates and are 
inconsistent with small increases in per capita income reported by the BEA. 
6. Individual return data generally is not available. When the IRS does make such data available to non-IRS researchers it
tends to be cross-sectional and is seldom matched with socio-economic data. A recent exception to the latter is provided by 
Tauchen, Witte, and Baron (1989). These authors analyze a data set which combines 1979 TCMP data with IRS 
administrative records and socio-economic data from the 1980 Census, matched at the 5-digit zip code level. Their results 
generally confirm those obtained herein, althoug� where comparable. the magnitude of effects is we.aker in their case.
7. For example, Dubin. Graetz, Udell, and Wilde (1989) use 1979 TCMP data aggregated to the IRS district level to analyze
taxpayers' decisions to use tax preparers. 
8. This variable, as we define it, includes any additional tax and penalty assessed as the result of examinations. It also 
includes employment taxes as these are not reported separately by the IRS. 
9. Prior to 1981 virtually all nonprofit organizations filed in Delaware. Starting in 1981 they began to file in the district of 
primary activity. We have therefore subtracted nonprofit returns filed from total returns filed (the fonner amounts to less 
than 2 percent of the latter). Also, prior to 1981 "declarations of estimated tax" were recorded as one entry per year for any 
taxpayer filing a declaration of estimated tax in any quarter. Starting in 1981 each quarterly form was counted as one entry, 
fr1creasing t.l1e nu.-nba of declarations of estimaied tax by a factor of four. We have adjusted "total returns filed" in 1981-85 
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examined; (6) additional tax and penalties recommended after examination for individual income tax 
returns; and (7) costs incurred by the Internal Revenue Service. 10
Using these seven primary variables, we construct four secondary variables which are used in 
our analysis: 
ICR: total collections from individual income and employment taxes divided by the number of 
individual income tax returns filed, in 1972 dollars-individual collections per return; 
RCAP: total individual income tax returns filed divided by total population-returns per capita; 
IAR: total individual income tax returns examined divided by total individual income tax 
returns filed-the individual audit rate; 
BPR: total IRS budget divided by total returns filed, in 1972 dollars-budget per return. 
We also use a number of social-economic variables taken from a variety of sources. These are 
all reported by calendar year: 
ST AXR: total state income tax paid as a percentage of total state income-the average state 
income tax rate; 
MT AXR: the maximum statutory marginal state income tax rate; 
PERED: percent of the adult population with at least a high school education; 11
PER45: percent of the adult population between 45 and 65 years old; 
PER65: percent of the adult population over 65 years old; 
UR: t'ie u.-iemployment rate; 
PI CAP: per capita income, in 197'2 dollars; 
PMAN: percent of the workforce employed in manufacturing; 
PSERV: percent of the workforce employed in the service industry. 
The employment and unemployment variables are included as they reflect opportunities to 
evade. The age and education variables are included because other studies, primarily surveys, 
suggest that they are irnportant.12 Finally, we expect that audit rates and compliance levels, as
reflected in collections and filings, are related but consider it fundamental to allow for the possible 
endogeneity of audit rates. Endogeneity occurs when elements of a taxpayer's income and tax status 
which are known by the taxpayer and observed by the IRS (but not by us) induce below average 
compliance and simultaneously induce greater audit rates. In this case, correlation between audit 
to account for this. 
10. We have ignored the approximately one to two percent of "examinations" that talce place at seven "regional service 
centers." each of which covers six to eight states. Thus "nwnber of returns examined," "additional tax and penalty," and 
"costs" include only the district level figures from the annual reports. 
11. We get the percent of the adult population with at least a high school education from Census data for 1976 and 1980 and 
interpolate for 1977, 1978, and 1979. For 1981through 1985 we combine data on the number of high school graduates with 
other demographic data to construct projections based on the 1980 values. 
12. Witte and Woodbury (1983) and Cowell (1985) provide reviews of the literature which suggest that these variables are 
important . See also Dubin and Wilde (1988). 
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rates and the unobseivables will lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters using ordinary least 
squares estimation. Consistent estimation then requires the use of an "instrument" which is 
correlated with audit rates but not with the unobseivables. The IRS budget per tax return filed, BPR, 
fills this role in our analysis, as is described in detail in the next section. 
Total state income taxes are taken from State Government Tax Collections 1977-1986, 
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. We divide this variable by total state income to get 
the average state tax rate. The average state tax rate, so constructed, may be correlated with 
unobseived factors that determine federal collections or returns filed. This potential endogeneity 
again may be accounted for through the use of an appropriate instrument. In this case we use the 
maximum statutory marginal tax rate, taken from Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 
1977-1986, published by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The latter 
is clearly exogenous as it is set legislatively and is not behaviorally determined. Furthermore, it is 
highly correlated with the average state tax rate. 
Finally, we have obtained from the IRS regional level data on the number of CP2000's issued. 
This allows us to construct another enforcement variable, which takes on common values for all 
states with a region: 
CPRA1E: the number of CP2000's issued divided by individual returns filed.13 
As with audit rates, the rate of issuance of CP2000s may be endogenous. To allow for this fact, we 
construct a final variable based on the number of documents issued by third parties reporting 
information to the IRS: 
INFRA 1E: the number of information returns filed divided by the number 
of individual returns filed.14 
As with CPRA 1E, INFRA 1E takes on common values for all states within a region. It is a natural 
instrument for CPRA1E since most CP2000s are issued on the basis of the IRS's Information 
Returns Program, and compliance by third parties with Ibis program is out of the control of 
individual taxpayers. 
The mean values of all variables and their standard deviations are given by year in Table 1. 
2.2 Estimation 
We pool state level data for the years 1977 to 1986 and estimate ICR and RCAP as functions 
of one-year lagged values ofIAR, STAXR, PER45, PER65, PERED, UR, PICAP, PMAN, PSERV, 
and CPRA 1E and a time trend (TIME) for the years 1978-1986.15 
13. Because the issuance of CP2000s is not, unlike routine audits, a process which is performed uniformly during the year, 
we have used a two-year moving average of the raw CP2000 data to construct CPRATE. 
14. As with CPRA TE, we use a two-year moving average of the information returns data to construct INFRA TE. 
15. Our analysis is conducted on a "cash-flow" basis since collections per return and returns filed per capita are reported by 
fiscal year, not by tax year. fu this case it is appropriate to lag all explanatory variables by one year. 
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+ a.,y'ER 45;,-1 + a.,/'ER 65;1-1 + <:t.sPERED;,-1 
(1) 
+ pgPSERV;,-1 + P10CPRATE;,_1 + efjCAP (2) 
The estimation of equations ( 1) and (2) is complicated by several statistical considerations. First, as 
noted above, we expect that the lagged audit rate, IAR;,-1o is correlated with the unobservable factors
that influence collections per return, efR, and with the unobservable factors that influence returns 
filed per capita, efjCAP. We employ a single-equation consistent estimation procedure to estimate
equations ( 1) and (2) using the lagged budget per return, BPR;,-1o as an instrument for IARu+ 16 We
16. A substantial theoretical literature devoted to taxpayer behavior developed in the tradition of Gary Becker's classic 
1968 article on the economics of crime, beginning a few years later with the publication of papers by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973). The consensus of this literature is that increasing the probability of audit or the 
penalty rate for underreporting tax liabilities will unambiguously reduce noncompliance, but that little else can be said 
conclusively regarding the effects on noncompliance of other factors such as income or tax rates (see, in particular, Yitzhaki, 
1974 or, more generally, reviews by Witte and Woodbury, 1983, and Cowell, 1985). 
The problem with models developed in the Becker tradition is that they ignore elements of the revenue collection 
process that need to be incorporated into any reasonable empirical specification of a compliance model. fu particular, if 
audit rates and punislunent levels are included as explanatory variables, some account must be taken of their potential 
endogeneity. This is a point which the empirical literature on crime, in contexts other than tax law, has taken into account 
(see, e.g. Pyle, 1986), but in the empirical literature on tax compliance often has been ignored (e.g. Witte and Woodbury, 
1985) or inadequately dealt with (e.g., Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and Nourzad, 1986). As noted in the tex� we use IRS 
budgets per return to identify the audit effect (see Dubin and Wilde, 1988). 
In another recent paper, Alm, Bahl and Murray (1989) analyze a random sample from all Jamaican individual 
income tax returns, and a subsample of audited returns selected from that sample. They estimate a two-stage tobit model 
using a dununy variable for whether a return was audited in the first stage, and in the second stage using the detected 
reported income as a dependent variable, with a selectivity correction for having been audited. �Bahl and Murray find 
that the probability of an audit increases with reported tax liability, capital losses and tax credits, while it decreases with 
dividend and wage income. UnreJXJrted taxes increase with the predicted probability of being audited, marginal tax rates, 
1-Jgher levels of post-audit after-tax income (a proxy fbr true income) and self-employment income, but decrease with 
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also use the appropriately lagged rate of filing of information returns, INFRATE;,-4, as an instrument 
forCPRATE;,+11 
Finally, our estimation procedure accounts for possible correlation of the unobservables e£CR 
and E§CAP over time. Inspection of the fitted residuals obtained using preliminary instrumental 
variables estimation indicated a correlative pattern consistent with the random components model 
(Maddala, 1971). This form of the error distribution implies a specific dependence of the 
unobservables over time. In particular, the random components model postulates a random error 
specific to a given state but constant over time: 
EfR = rtfCR + �£CR 
E RCAP _ ,, flCAP + � flCAP 1t - · u �Ii · 
(3) 
(4) 
To account for the dependence in the unobservables, we form the optimally weighted average of 
between- and within-group estimates to obtain the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator. GLS 
estimation of this type provides more than a gain in efficiency. Not adjusting for random effects 
may lead to incorrect inferences regarding endogeneity and the apparent insignificance of some 
structural effects. The optimal weighting of first stage estimates is calculated by a simple 
transformation of the estimated standard errors from between- and within-group estimators 
(Maddala, 1971). Given the potemial endogeneity of audit and state tax rates, we use instnmiental 
variables to obtain consistent estimates of the error compollents.18 
GLS estimates were obtained by subtracting a fraction e of the mean value of each variable by 
state from each observation of that variable within that state. The constant e is a function of the 
error variances of between and within-group estimators, with adjustments made for degrees of 
freedom.19 Transformation of the data into Gauss-Markov form then allows us to test for the
presence of endogeneity and to construct consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters, which 
we refer to below as IV-GLS estimates. 
The results of the estimation are provided in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents the results for 
the collections per return equation (1) and returns filed per capita equation (2). Table 3 presents 
higher levels of wage, dividend, or rental income. 
17. There is generally a substantial delay between the time third party reports are received by the IRS and the time they are 
matched to individual taxpayers and CP2000s are issued. We follow the timing of the actual audit cycle and use INFRA TE 
lagged three years to instrument CPRA TE. 
18. Within-group estimation., or equivalently fixed-effects, does not account for variation across states and is therefore not 
fully efficient. This last point notwithstancling, we have performed specification tests on the fixed-effects models and have 
detected the continued presence of endogenous enforcement variables. This suggests that at least some portion of the 
endogeneity of the audit and CP2000 rates are due to correlation with the unobserved non-individual specific error. Titls 
precludes the use of other estimation methods which seemingly are appropriate in this context. including. for example, that 
suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981). 
19. For the audit rate equation 0 = .687, for the CP2000 rate equation 0 = .319, for the individual collections equation 
6 = .708, and for the returns filed equation 6 = .885. 
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reduced form equations for the audit rate and CP2000 rate. 
3. RESULTS
3.1 Audit Rates 
The audit rate is endogenous in both the collections equation and the returns filed equation: the 
Hausman statistic for the former is 3.21 while for the latter it is -3.53. As expected, the audit rate is
significantly influenced by the IRS budget per return, with respect to which it is increasing. Also as 
expected, the audit rate is decreasing in the percent employed in manufacturing and is increasing in 
the percent employed in the service industry. It is independent of income per capita and the percent 
of the population over 65, but is decreasing in the percent of the adult population between 45 and 65 
years old. It is independent of the unemployment rate but increasing in the percent of the adult 
population with a high school education. Finally it is independent of the information returns rate. 
With respect to collections per return, the audit rate has a significant positive effect. As we 
show below, this is the case even when the additional tax and penalty associated with examinations 
is subtracted from total collections. We interpret the positive effect of the audit rate on collections 
per return as arising from increased compliance and consider it to be strong evidence of the deterrent 
effect of audits on taxpayer noncompliance. On the other hand, audits bear a negative relationship to 
returns filed per capita. This result can be explained, possibly, by the fact that routine IRS audits are 
not an effective mechanism for locating nonfilers. Thus, historically at least, one way to escape 
audits has been simply not to file. 
We have conducted some experiments based on our estimates which examine the intertemporal 
effects of declining audit rates. Using the IV-GLS estimates from Table 2, we have calculated for 
each year the predicted value of total collections from individual returns that would have been 
realized had the audit rate remained constant at its 1977 level. By 1986 we estimate that maintaining 
the audit rate at its 1977 level would have increased collections by 41.4 billion 1986 dollars, or 7 
percent of total individual collections in 1986 (net of refunds).20 
We are also able to isolate and estimate the indirect revenue effect of audits. To do this, we 
subtract the additional taxes and penalties resulting from IRS examinations from total IRS 
collections (net of refunds), for each state in each year, and divide by the number of individual 
returns filed in order to generate a collections per return variable which does not include the revenue 
produced by the examinations process. We then repeat ourIV-GLS estimation using this as the 
dependent variable, and calculate a predicted value for the increase in total individual collections for 
1986 that would have resulted from holding audit rates at their 1977 levels. This value, 34.4 billion
dollars, is 83 percent of our original estimate, which included the additional tax and penalty resulting
from IRS examinations. Thus it represents the indirect revenue effect--0r spillover effect--0f the 
increase in audit rates. 21 
20. The average audit rate fell from 1.8 percent to 1.1 percent over this period 
21. Tauchen, Witte, and Beron (1989) also find a significant spillover effect of audits. However, t.lieir esti.'?lates :yield 
indirect revenue effects approximately equal to direct revenue effects. 
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3.2 The CP2000 Rate 
A CP2000 is an automatic computer notice informing a taxpayer that taxes are due based on 
information reported by third parties or IRS checks of the return for internal consistency. As such, 
one might expect, a priori, that increases in CP2000's issued would have a deterrent effect on 
noncompliance; i.e., they would increase collections per return (but not necessarily returns filed per 
capita). At the same time, states with greater noncompliance might be expected to have higher 
CP2000 rates, generating an endogeneity issue. Indeed, the Hausman statistic for endogeneity of the 
CP2000 rate in the collections per return equation is 1.97 and in the returns tiled per capita equation 
it is 4.41. (These values are significant at the 5 percent level.) However, after allowing for 
endogeneity of the CP2000 rate, we find no significant relationship between it and collections per 
return and a positive relationship between it and returns filed per capita. 
A comparison between our results for the CP2000 rate and our results for the audit rate sheds 
additional light on current IRS enforcement strategies. As the reduced form estimates given in Table 
3 indicate, the two enforcement tools are quite different. In particular, CP2000s do not appear to act 
as substitutes for traditional audits with respect to collections, despite the common assertion that the 
increase in the CP2000 rate in recent years has mitigated the undesirable implications of the 
dramatic fall in audit rates.22
3.3 Tax Rates 
Forty-three states currently have state income taxes. In all these states there is substantial 
overlap between the information relevant for federal and state income tax computations. Taxpayers 
can be expected to coordinate their reports of relevant tax items, including, for example, income and 
deductions, on their federal and state income tax returns, and they likely will perceive there to be a 
connection between the probability of audit for state and federal tax underreporting. Moreover, both 
state and federal returns are filed subject to penalties for perjury as well as for tax fraud. Taxpayers 
rightly therefore will expect that inconsistencies in reporting on federal and state returns will 
increase the risks of imposition of these harsher penalties for tax noncompliance that depend on the 
government's ability to prove that taxpayer's understatements were willful. 
There also is a direct linkage among the activities of state and federal tax enforcement 
agencies. Congress and state legislatures have explicitly provided for exchanges of otherwise 
confidential tax return and other tax information between the states and the IRS "to increase tax 
revenues and taxpayer compliance and reduce duplicate resource expenditures."23 We therefore 
expect that a strong correlation will exist between taxpayers' underreporting on federal and state 
22. Respecting the notion that audits and CP2000s may be substitutes, we have performed the following experiment. We 
define the "contact rate" as the sum of the audit rate and the CP2000 rate. We then reestimate our collections per return and 
returns filed per capita models using just the contact rate instead of both the audit rate and the CP2000 rate (this amounts to 
constraining the coefficients on the audit rate and the CP2000 rate to be equal). The contact rate is endogenous in both 
models but has much smaller coefficients than the coefficients on the audit rate in Table 2. Returning the audit rate to its 
1977 level in this case yields an additional revenue estimate of only $12.6 billion. 
11 
returns. 
Perhaps, smprisingly, we find that the average state income tax rate is not endogenous in either 
the collections equation or the returns filed equation: the Hausman statistic for the former is 1.17 
while for the latter it is 1.39.24 Furthermore, when treated as exogenous, in both equations the
coefficient on STAXR is not statistically significant (the t-statistics are 0.18 and --0.56, respectively). 
This is of interest insofar as we do not find a negative effect of state income tax rates on collections 
per return at the federal level, a relationship that should be expected, other things equal, given the 
deductibility of state income taxes on federal returns during the period covered by this study.25
23. Internal Revenue Service, Manual, Disclosure of lnformaJion Handbook, § (33) 00. For a generalization of Graetz, 
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) which introduces a state tax agency as a strategic actor in the tax compliance game see Dubin, 
Graetz and Wilde (1987). We find that as long as there is a linkage between the likelihood of audit at the state and federal 
levels, an increase in the state income tax rate increases compliance at the federal level. A recent cross.sectional study due 
to Cox (1986) also raises the issue of the effect of state income taxes on federal income tax compliance. Using 1979 TCMP 
data, but controlling only for �come, he finds no _systema_tic evidence of an effect_oJ state �_ra):es on __ complianc_e_ 
24. We test for endogeneity of ST AXR using the maximum statutory marginal tax rate (MT AXR) as an instrwnent The 
reduced form equation for the average state income tax rate is generally uninteresting. Since statutory state income tax rates 
vary considerably across the states, virtually all the variation in ST AXR for which we can account is explained by MT AXR. 
25. We have constructed average marginal federal tax rates using techniques similar to those discussed by Barro and 
Sahasakul (1983). Since these do not take on separate values for each state, they are not distinguishable from general time 
effects as captured by the variable TIME. 
Using individual return data and the results of actual IRS audits conducted as part of the 1979 IRS Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (fCMP), Clotfelter (1983) models underreported income as a function of effective 
marginal tax rates, after-tax income, wages as a proportion of adjusted gross income, interest and dividends as a proportion 
of adjusted gross income, and several socio-economic variables. Even though Clotfelter finds a negative relationship 
between his measure of the effective marginal tax rate and compliance, his analysis omits the audit rate because of potential 
simultaneity problems. 
Crane and Nourzad (1986) analyze the effect of inilation on aggregate tax evasion over the period 1947·81, 
concluding that increases in the inflation rate or the marginal tax rate increase tax evasion. Their measure of tax evasion is 
based on the difference between the Adjusted Gross Income estimate derived by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and that 
reported by the IRS, their measure of the fine rate is the ratio of additional taxes and penalties assessed by the IRS to the 
amount of tax evaded, and their measure of true income is the same BEA estimate of adjusted gross income used to 
construct their measure of tax evasion. Their estimation allows for the simultaneity intrcxluced by the construction of the 
latter, but not audit rates, fines, or marginal tax rates, the last of which are constructed using a technique similar to that of 
Clotfelter. 
Alexander and Feinstein (1986), using 1982 TCMP data, find negative effects of marginal tax rates on compliance. 
Tax rates enter in their model through the probability of detection. Their equation for the probability of detection is 
asswned to be independent of their compliance equatio� which leads them to estimate a recursive rather than simultaneous 
system. Their approach therefore is analogous to treating audit rates exogenously. 
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3.4 Socio-Economic Factors
Per Capita Income. As expected, increases in per capita income have a positive effect on collections 
per return and returns filed per capita. They have no effect on audit or CP2000 rates. 
High-School Education. The percent of the adult population with at least a high school education is 
positively related to collections per return, returns filed per capita, and audit rates. An increase in the 
percent of the adult population with at least a high school education decreases the CP2000 rate. 
Age. To test the effects of age, we employ two age variables, the percent of the adult population 
between 45 and 65 years old and the percent of the adult population over 65 years old. Only the 
former reflects a pure age effect since taxpayers over 65 are eligible for tax reductions. Increases in 
the percent of the adult population between 45 and 65 are positively associated with collections per 
return and negatively associated with audit rates. They have no effect on audit or CP2000 rates. 
Increases in the percent of the adult population over 65 show no discernible effects. 
Employment Patterns. Increases in the unemployment rate have no apparent effect on collections 
per return or the audit rate. However, they reduce returns filed per capita. With respect to patterns 
of employment, we expect a positive association between compliance levels and percentage 
employment in manufacturing industries and a negative association between compliance levels and 
percentage employment in service industries---principally because of variations in withholding 
coverage. ·Our results are broadly consistent with these expectations. PMAN is positively refated to 
collections per return and negatively related to the audit rate. PSERV is independent of collections 
per return and positively related to the audit rate. It is also positively related to returns filed per 
capita. 
4. CONCLUSION
Our results corroborate the central role of audit rates in the revenue collection process. The 
impact of the decade-long fall in audit rates on tax collections seems to have been serious indeed. A 
budgetary practice of including IRS audit personnel within a general political philosophy limiting 
the desired size of government agencies is enonnously costly. Additional dollars spent on tax audits 
appear to have substantial marginal productivity, a fact that might have heretofore been concealed by 
the aggregate stability of the federal revenue collection process over time. 
With respect to socio-economic factors, the most interesting finding in this study is the strong 
positive relationship between high school education and returns filed per capita. This finding is 
significant since it provides the first real empirical insight into the population of nonfilers, about 
which very little is now known. It also suggests potential opportunities for IRS provision of 
information to the populace and highlights the significance of simplifying the return filing process.26 
26. In c-0P.wi...st, ot.11.er studies fo�ve reccn1.T..ended tax shnpli:fication and i."1.creased i.'".fcnnation and taxpayer assistance 
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President Bush's Budget Proposals for fiscal year 1991 include additional IRS enforcement
funding and estimates that such funding will produce about $5.5 billion of additional revenue during
the next five years. In a somewhat similar vein, the Senate version of the 1986 Tax Reform Act
would have created a special Tax Administration Trust Fund to ensure increases in IRS enforcement 
budgets in future years. This proposal was explicitly intended to address the Senate's concerns that
the audit rate had fallen by half during the prior decade. The Senate Finance Committee's Report 
estimated that this trust fund would have produced $17.6 billion of additional revenues in the five
fiscal years 1987-1991. These estimates were greeted skeptically and the proposal was not included
in the 1986 act, as finally enacted. Our results here suggest that, if anything, the Senate's estimates
understated, not overstated, the revenue impact of such a program. The IRS audit capacity deserves 
protection. 
without either specifying targets for such information or detailing why such efforts are likely to stimulate compliance. See, 
e.g., American Bar Association Commission on Tax Compliance, Report and Recommendations, July 1987. 
TABLE 1: Mean Values of Variables by Year 
(Standard errors in parenthesis) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
!CR 1.70 1.74 1.85 1.85 1.97 1.97 1.88 1.91 1.99 1.97 
(.70) (.61) (.62) (.64) (.72) (.71) (.68) (.72) (.73) (.71) 
RCAP .40 .41 .42 .42 .42 .42 .42 .42 .43 .43 
(.034) (.032) (.033) (.035) (.033) (.032) (.034) (.036) (.037) (.040) 
JAR 1.88 1.77 1.66 1.66 1.53 1.40 1.36 1.23 1.15 1.00 
(.65) (.59) (.58) (.58) (.45) (.35) (.37) (.38) (.37) (.43) 
STAXR 1.66 1.65 1.66 1.61 1.58 1.63 1.70 1.80 1.77 1.75 
(1.16) (l.08) (1.05) (l.04) (1.06) (l.12) (1.16) (l.17) (1.12) (l.10) 
PERED .67 .67 .67 .67 .68 .68 .67 .68 .68 .68 
(.073) (.074) (.075) (.076) (.077) (.078) (.080) (.081) (.083) (.085) 
PER45 .28 .28 .28 .27 .26 .26 .25 .25 .25 .25 
(.016) (.016) (.015) (.018) (.017) (.016) (.015) (.014) (.016) (.016) 
PER65 .15 .15 .15 .15 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 
(.029) (.028) (.029) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.029) (.027) 
UR .066 .057 .055 .068 .073 .093 .093 .073 .071 .069 
(.016) (.015) (.014) (.016) (.019) (.023) (.025) (.022) (.019) (.022) 
PI CAP 4.82 5.03 5.14 5.14 5.24 5.20 5.28 5.54 5.75 5.68 
(.69) (.66) (.65) (.73) (.73) (.80) (.81) (.81) (.91) (.95) 
PMAN .22 .21 .21 .21 .20 .19 .19 .19 .18 .18 
(.089) (.087) (.085) (.082) (.082) (.079) (.077) (.077) (.073) (.071) 
PSERV .18 .18 .18 .19 .20 .21 .21 .21 .22 .22 
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
BPR .0050 .0050 .0047 .0045 .0044 
.0044 .0048 .0048 .0046 .0042 
(.0013) (.0014) (.0014) (.0014) (.0012) (.0012) (.0013) (.0014) (.0013) (.0014) 
MTAXR 7.27 7.31 7.29 7.09 7.CfJ 6.89 7.19 7.20 7.12 7.12 
(4.47) (4.55) (4.54) (4.30) (4.22) (3.93) (4.09) (4.08) (3.98) (3.98) 
CPRATE 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.02 2.38 4.17 3.13 
(.52) (.42) (.72) (1.09) 
INFRATE 3.38 3.52 3.62 3.85 4.22 4.44 4.65 5.23 5.88 6.84 
(I.48) (1.53) (1.43) (l.55) (1.59) (1.74) (1.60) (2.03) (2.14) (*) 
* This is a national average, regional disaggregates are not available after 1985.
TABLE 2: Collections Per Return and Returns Filed Per Capita* 
Dependent Variable 
ICR RCAP 
ONE -4.20 773.4 
(-2.14) (4.46) 
IAR(-1) .28 -20.19 
(2.91) (-3.33) 
CPRATE(-1) .009 9.57 
(.23) ( l .87) 
STAXR(-1) .004 -.71 
(.18) (-.56) 
PERED(-1) .19 11.89 
(4.02) (2.37) 
PER45(-l )  3.96 -67.73 
(2.44) (-.66) 
PER65(-l)  1.32 -45.07 
(.89) (-.68) 
UR(-!) -.45 -144.1 
(-.54) (-2.02) 
PICAP(-1) .42 26.55 
(9.42) (11.91) 
PMAN(-1) 2.37 1.48 
(3.51) (.06) 
PSERV(-1) .24 348.8 
(.19) (6.60) 
TIME .02 -6.17 
(.98) (-3.13) 
* !-statistics in parenthesis
TABLE 3: Audit Rates and CP2000 Rates* 
Dependent Variable 
IAR(-1) CPRATE(-1) 
ONE 14.47 -62.81 
(11.85) (-16.98) 
STAXR(-1) .03 -.039 
(1.26) (-1.13) 
NEWED(-!) .17 -1.46 
(2.48) (-2.29) 
PER45(-1) -8.9 -1.85 
(-5.67) (-.51) 
PER65(-1) .90 -1.86 
(.68) (-.97) 
UR(-1) -.54 -2.31 
(-.68) (-1.41) 
PICAP(-1) -.07 -.05 
(-1.66) (-.69) 
PMAN(-1) -.95 -.42 
(-2.07) (-.57) 
PSERV(-1) 2.42 -.51 
(2.68) (-.43) 
TIME -.14 .78 
(-10.93) (21.06) 
BPR(-1) 214.7 -27.08 
(8.70) (-.56) 
INFRATE(-4) -.03 .21 
(-.98) (6.65) 
* t-statistics in parenthesis
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